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Sinn	Fein	won’t	drop	its	abstentionist	policy	over
Brexit	–	and	that’s	not	necessarily	a	bad	thing
Sean	Swan	provides	a	brief	history	of	how	Sinn	Fein	came	to	adopt	its	abstentionist	policy	and	explains	why	it	will
not	change	a	century-long	stance	to	help	defeat	Brexit	in	Westminster.	He	writes	that	if	they	were	to	drop
abstentionism,	dissident	republican	organisations	would	gain	support,	to	the	detriment	of	the	peace	process.	At	the
same	time,	were	Brexit	to	be	blocked	with	the	help	of	Sinn	Fein	and	the	SNP,	the	result	would	be	an	enflamed
English	nationalism.
Polly	Toynbee	recently	urged	Sinn	Fein	to	drop	its	abstentionist	policy	and	attend	Westminster	in	order	to	help	defeat
Brexit.	She	wrote	of	how	‘all	red	lines	may	be	up	for	reconsideration	–	even	one	fixed	since	1917,	the	question	of
Sinn	Féin’s	seats	in	parliament.’	Her	reference	was	to	Sinn	Fein	adopting	a	republican	position	in	that	year.	However,
the	abstentionist	policy	predates	1917:	its	origins	lie	with	Arthur	Griffith,	the	founder	of	Sinn	Fein,	who	wrote	in	1904
that:
we	declare	that	we	will	take	part	neither	in	the	Imperial	Parliament	nor	in	any	other	assembly	whatsoever
of	the	representatives	of	the	Empire;	and	further,	that	we	cannot	recognise	the	right	of	the	said	Imperial
Parliament	to	legislate	on	the	affairs	of	Hungary
Yes,	Hungary.	He	was	quoting	Ferenc	Deák	in	the	‘First	Address	of	the	Hungarian	Diet	of	1861’.	Griffin	found
Abstentionism	in	the	policy	of	the	Hungarian	nationalist	which	led	to	the	1867	Ausgleich	and	the	creation	of	the
Austro-Hungarian	dual	monarchy.	The	initial	policy	of	Sinn	Fein	was	the	re-establishment	of	the	Irish	parliament
which	had	been	abolished	by	the	1800	Act	of	Union	and	the	creation	of	an	Anglo-Irish	dual	monarchy.	The	policy	of
the	then-existing	Irish	Parliamentary	Party	was	condemned	for	saving	‘the	face	of	tyranny	by	sending	Irishmen	to	sit
impotently	in	a	foreign	legislature,	while	it	forms	the	instruments	of	his	oppression’.
Sinn	Fein	only	became	republican	in	1917,	when	the	republican	veterans	of	the	1916	Easter	Rising	took	it	over.	The
abstentionist	policy	was	maintained	and	put	into	practice	in	the	wake	of	the	1918	general	election,	in	which	Sinn	Fein
took	73	of	Ireland’s	105	Westminster	seats.	The	Sinn	Fein	MPs	refused	to	take	their	seats	in	Westminster,
assembling	instead	in	Dublin	as	Dail	Eireann.	The	Dail	issued	a	declaration	of	independence	and	the	War	of
Independence	soon	followed.	But	the	republic	proclaimed	during	the	1916	Rising	was	not	to	be.	The	1921	Anglo-Irish
Treaty	created	a	partitioned	Ireland	with	a	devolved	Northern	Ireland	staying	within	the	UK	and	a	southern	Irish	Free
State	with	dominion	status	remaining	within	the	Empire.
Sinn	Fein	split	on	the	Anglo-Irish	Treaty	and	a	civil	war	followed.	The	defeated	anti-Treaty	side,	which	kept	the	name
‘Sinn	Fein’,	refused	to	recognise	either	the	two	Irish	states	or	their	parliaments	which	had	been	created	by	the	treaty.
This	politically	futile	position	led	then	Sinn	Fein	president	Eamon	de	Valera	to	propose	ending	Abstentionism,	which
led	to	another	republican	split.	The	minority	who	opposed	dropping	Abstentionism	continued	as	Sinn	Fein	while	the
breakaway	group	became	Fianna	Fail.
Abstentionism	became	something	of	a	shibboleth	of	the	republican	faith,	separating	the	revolutionary	republicans
from	the	reformist	‘constitutional	nationalists’.	It	also	helped	provide	a	useful	Cordon	sanitaire	between	the
Republican	movement	and	politics	at	times	when	it	was	committed	to	‘physical	force’	republicanism.	But	such
political	sterility	would	always	be	seen	as	futile	by	republican	modernisers.
Moves	to	drop	Abstentionism	was	one	of	the	causes	of	a	republican	split	on	the	eve	of	the	Troubles	in	1969/70.	This
split	led	to	Provisional	Sinn	Fein,	which	maintained	Abstentionism,	and	Official	Sinn	Fein	which	favoured	dropping	it
and	has	since	evolved	into	the	Workers’	Party	of	Ireland.	The	issue	of	Abstentionism	would	arise	for	Provisional	Sinn
Fein	in	the	wake	of	the	Hunger	Strikes,	in	which	republican	prisoners	on	hunger	strike	successfully	contested	seats
north	and	south.	What	the	Hunger	Strikes	had	demonstrated	was	that	republicans	could	win	seats	in	both
jurisdictions.
This	conclusion	led	to	what,	from	1981	onwards,	became	known	as	the	Aramlite	and	Ballot-box	strategy.	It	was
outlined	by	Danny	Morrison	at	the	1981	Sinn	Fein	Ard	Fheis:	‘Who	here	really	believes	we	can	win	the	war	through
the	ballot	box?	But	will	anyone	here	object	if,	with	a	ballot	paper	in	this	hand	and	an	Armalite	in	the	other,	we	take
power	in	Ireland?’
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However,	the	much	desired	republican	expansion	in	the	south	was	slow	to	materialise.	Lack	of	support	for	Sinn	Fein
in	the	south	was	probably	due	to	the	IRA’s	campaign	and	Sinn	Fein’s	support	for	it,	but	it	was	attributed	to	the	policy
of	Abstentionism.	In	1986	Sinn	Fein	consequently	voted	to	drop	Abstentionism	in	relation	to	the	Dail.	But	the	vote
was	only	held	after	an	IRA	Army	Convention	had	already	voted	in	favour	of	such	a	step.	Even	so,	the	vote	provoked
a	split	which	led	to	the	creation	of	Republican	Sinn	Fein.	Republican	Sinn	Fein	still	exists	and	supports	the	dissident
republican	paramilitary	organisation	the	Continuity	IRA.
The	political	risk	for	Sinn	Fein	in	dropping	Abstentionism	as	it	relates	to	Westminster	is	that	it	would	make	Sinn	Fein,
in	republican	eyes,	‘just	another	political	party’.	It	would	strengthen	the	claims	of	Dissident	republican	organisations,
such	as	Republican	Sinn	Fein	and	the	Continuity	IRA,	that	they	are	the	authentic	republican	movement,	and	increase
both	their	legitimacy	and,	possibly,	popular	support.	It	would	also	risk	a	split	within	Sinn	Fein	itself.	None	of	this
would	bode	well	for	the	peace	process.
Sinn	Fein	won	all	the	seats	with	a	nationalist	majority	in	Northern	Ireland	in	2017.	That	election	probably	represents
‘peak	Sinn	Fein’.	As	West	Belfast	Sinn	Fein	MP	Paul	Maskey	put	it	in	a	rejoinder	to	Toynbee:	‘In	2017,	I	and	other
[Sinn	Fein]	MPs	were	elected	on	a	mandate	to	actively	abstain	from	Westminster’.	If	you	can	peak	with
Abstentionism,	there’s	probably	no	pressing	political	reason	to	drop	it.
It	is	also	worth	pondering	what	would	be	the	effects	in	England,	were	Brexit	to	be	blocked	by	a	Westminster	vote
including	Sinn	Fein	and,	presumably,	the	SNP.	It	is	not	difficult	to	imagine	it	leading	to	the	emergence	of	an	enflamed
English	nationalism	amongst	the	frustrated	Brexiteers.	It	is	possible	that	we	would	see	demands	for	English
‘independence’	from	the	UK.
It	is	an	indication	of	the	strangeness	of	the	times	in	which	we	live	that	an	organ	of	English	liberalism,	the	Guardian,
would	be	appealing	to	Sinn	Fein	(and	the	SNP)	to	save	it	from	Brexit.	But	for	better	or	for	worse,	the	task	of	saving
England	from	itself	must	ultimately	fall	to	the	English	people.
_______
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